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Contracting with Communities: An
Analysis of the Enforceability of
Community Benefits Agreements
Hannah P. Stephan†
Introduction
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs), contracts between
community members and developers, have emerged in the last few
decades as a powerful tool for community groups when faced with a
new development in their neighborhood.1 Community members
often have concerns about displacement due to the increased cost of
living when a new development is built in a particular area,2 so the
use of a CBA can help community members address these concerns
with developers in a productive way. In turn, the developers gain
support from community groups for the developments, which may
ease tensions in city approval proceedings and improve the general
perception of developers in the neighborhood once their project is
complete.3
The creation and enforcement of Community Benefits
Agreements play a role in a wide variety of contexts, including land
†. Hannah P. Stephan, University of Minnesota Law School Class of 2022.
Thank you to Jim Stephan, Mara Stephan, Susan Stephan, Mary Alice Kubit, Phyllis
Grumney, and Darlene Widen-Hayes for their support during my time in law school;
to Clifford Helm, Professor Brett McDonnell, and Stephen Earnest for their feedback
on early ideas and drafts of this Note; and to the Editors and Staff Members of the
Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality for their time, energy, and effort in editing
and publishing this Note.
1. Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, in BUILDING HEALTHY
COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES,
LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 189, 189 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds.,
2009).
2. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community
Benefits Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other
Considerations for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26
UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 291, 298 (2008) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine,
Understanding CBAs] (“Large-scale urban developments tend to have
disproportionate impact on low-income and minority communities, and CBAs
provide a mechanism for these communities to ensure that they will benefit from
developments rather than being overlooked or displaced through gentrification.”).
3. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Gurgol, Won’t You Be My Neighbor? Ensuring
Productive Land Use Through Enforceable Community Benefits Agreements, 46 U.
TOL. L. REV. 473, 491 (2015) (explaining that community members agree to support
projects, which can add efficiency to development projects).
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use planning,4 race equity,5 and environmental justice efforts.6
Understanding each of these contexts is essential to seeing CBAs as
a tool for fairer communities and as an important piece in the puzzle
of equitable development, and it is important in conceptualizing
why it is to the benefit of the community for these agreements to be
enforceable.
Equitable development advocates are largely in favor of CBAs
as a tool,7 but some commentators caution that they should only be
a piece of the land use planning puzzle rather than a singular
solution for equitable development.8 The idea of land use planning,
though inherent in many past municipal-level decisions, did not
emerge as a separate concept until zoning ordinances began to gain
attention.9 With demographic changes and ever-increasing levels of
development,10 land use planning will continue to be an important
topic, and CBAs are poised to be a key part of the discussion.
We can also understand CBAs as a tool for race equity and as
a way to elevate historically marginalized communities.11 In
general, civil rights scholars see housing policy and planning, of
which CBAs can be a part, as a key element to reducing the impacts
of past racist policies.12 As early as 2006, a Minneapolis
4. See, e.g., id. at 475 (“To ensure CBAs will operate as effectively as possible,
courts should view them through the lens of traditional land use decisions.”).
5. See, e.g., Salkin & Lavine, Understanding CBAs, supra note 2, at 298 (“CBAs
can be effective tools for promoting racial and social equity.”).
6. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements and
Comprehensive Planning: Balancing Community Empowerment and the Police
Power, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 157, 159 (2009) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine, CBAs and
Comprehensive Planning].
7. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 1, at 189 (“CBAs have generated tremendous
excitement among community groups and advocates of equitable development, as
well as substantial interest from local government, academia, the media, planning
circles, and philanthropic foundations.”).
8. See, e.g., id. at 199 (arguing that CBAs are “substantially limited as a longterm strategy for shaping economic development” because of the time and resources
it takes to negotiate these agreements).
9. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, THOMAS E. ROBERTS, PATRICIA E. SALKIN
& RYAN MAX ROWBERRY, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW
§ 1.1 (3d ed., 2021).
10. Id. at § 1.3.
11. See CMTY. BENEFITS L. CTR., COMMON CHALLENGES IN NEGOTIATING
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS AND HOW TO AVOID THEM 3, 7 (2016) (centering
race equity in its explanation of effective CBAs and in its statement of the mission
of the CBA movement in general).
12. See, e.g., Liz Enochs, Segregation Scholar Richard Rothstein Fighting for
New Civil Rights Movement with Best Weapon He Has: Research, SHAREABLE (Sept.
3, 2020), https://www.shareable.net/segregation-scholar-richard-rothstein-fightingfor-new-civil-rights-movement-with-best-weapon-he-has-research/
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organization linked CBAs and race equity in a report, stating that
communities of color are often excluded from the processes in which
development decisions are made, and that “CBAs provide them with
a vehicle for guarding against gentrification and displacement,” as
well as “a mechanism through which an honest discussion of racism
and its historic and current effects can occur.”13 Though the creation
and implementation of CBAs will not solve the many problems
created by racist policies, they can be a helpful tool that is rooted in
the community with the goal of enacting important changes.
CBAs are also influential in the environmental justice
movement.14 This movement, a largely community-based effort,
seeks to “ensure a fair distribution of both environmental burdens
and environmental goods” by including community members in
planning processes.15 This helps avoid outcomes in which locally
unwanted land uses are located in historically disinvested
communities and areas,16 which may cause negative health
outcomes for communities and cause them to experience further
harm.17 CBAs can work toward this goal in a variety of ways,
including by requiring that developers meet certain environmental
standards, obtain Leadership in Environmental and Energy Design
(LEED) certification, and obtain community input on
environmental design.18
[https://perma.cc/L2VG-G59D] (describing residential segregation as the root of
other racial disparities such as police abuse and mass incarceration).
13. MAURA BROWN, ALL. FOR METRO. STABILITY, COMMUNITY BENEFITS
AGREEMENTS: AN IMPORTANT TOOL IN THE GROWING TWIN CITIES EQUITY
MOVEMENT 2 (2006); see also Press Release, Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rts.,
Coalition Signs Community Benefits Agreement with Proposed Bucktown
Dispensary (Jul. 22, 2020), https://www.clccrul.org/blog/2020/7/22/cannabis-equityillinois-coalition-signs-community-benefits-agreement-with-proposed-zen-leafbucktown-dispensary [https://perma.cc/PD39-PKTJ] (describing a CBA with the goal
of prioritizing individuals for marijuana dispensary jobs who have been most
impacted by the past criminalization of marijuana, particularly individuals within
communities of color); DANIEL KRAVETZ, EQUITABLE DETROIT COAL., FIGHTING FOR
EQUITY IN DEVELOPMENT: THE STORY OF DETROIT’S COMMUNITY BENEFITS
ORDINANCE 8 (2017) (explaining how a CBA was brought to fruition by a coalition
led mostly by women of color).
14. See Salkin & Lavine, CBAs and Comprehensive Planning, supra note 6, at
159.
15. Id.
16. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 9, at § 1.3.
17. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, CREATING THE HEALTHIEST NATION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL 1 (“Disproportionate exposures to pollutants and
adverse effects of climate change can result in a multitude of severe health issues
that are costly for the American people.”).
18. Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies in Effect, P’SHIP
FOR WORKING FAMILIES, https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/page/policy-tools-
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This Note will provide context and background surrounding
the creation and current implementation of Community Benefits
Agreements, including their effectiveness and reception in the
public opinion. The primary goal of this Note is to discuss several
concerns regarding the enforceability of CBAs as private contracts.
Overall, this Note will argue that issues raised about the
enforceability of CBAs in terms of consideration, duties of
successors and assigns, and third-party enforcement should
generally not prohibit a CBA from being perceived as valid and
enforceable by courts or communities, though interpretation will
depend on each individual contract. In Part I, this Note will provide
background information about the creation and use of CBAs. In
Part II, this Note will explain the current leading concerns with the
enforceability of CBAs: consideration, successors and assigns, and
third-party beneficiaries. This Note will provide an analysis of these
concerns in Parts III–V to show that CBAs should generally be
understood to be enforceable in court but are largely dependent on
the specific contractual language that is employed.
I.

History and Effectiveness of Community Benefits
Agreements
A. History of Community Benefits Agreements

The first Community Benefits Agreement was formed in
California in the 1990s, with the Hollywood and Highland
agreement.19 The growth in popularity of CBAs is a result of the
desire to see accountability from large developers, due to the
common problem of gentrification in low-income communities
following the construction of large developments.20 Gentrification
tends to cause displacement of existing community members due to
increased rent and cost of living in the area.21 This has increasingly

community-benefits-agreements-and-policies-effect [https://perma.cc/N86U-7G72]
(outlining the key provisions of current CBAs, including environmental provisions).
19. Salkin & Lavine, Understanding CBAs, supra note 2, at 301 (describing the
Hollywood and Highland agreement, which was enacted in 1998 as a response to
traffic, environmental, and crime concerns surrounding the development of the $388
million theater which now hosts the Oscar awards).
20. Id. at 298.
21. Langston A. Tolbert, Utilizing Educational Focused Community Funds in the
Fight Against Displacement and the Revitalization of Distressed Communities, 63
HOW. L.J. 303, 307 (2020).
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become a larger problem due to the growing populations in big
cities.22
With this backdrop, the Community Benefits Agreement
emerged as a contractual tool for developers and community
advocates to partner on the terms for a new development. Since
these agreements are private contracts, it is hard to know the exact
number that are currently in effect, but researchers estimate that
at least twenty major CBAs are currently in place around the
country.23 CBAs are valuable to both community organizations and
developers, though the goals of each group are different. Coalitions
of community organizations typically seek to avoid community
member displacement and provide benefits to current residents of
an area.24 Developers seek to save money, perhaps by reduced time
spent in city procedures or dealing with legal challenges; to gain a
higher likelihood of approval in city processes; and to gain positive
press in the community.25 As such, CBAs outline certain benefits
that a developer agrees to provide the community, which are
specific to each community but may include terms such as job
training programs or wage requirements.26 In return, the
community advocates typically promise to support the project in the
community and at municipal meetings regarding approval of the
development.27 They may also agree not to sue the developer.28
22. Salkin & Lavine, Understanding CBAs, supra note 2, at 297 (explaining that
growth in the largest U.S. cities has been very rapid and with that growth comes a
lot of competition for development).
23. See Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies in Effect,
supra note 18. It is difficult to determine the exact number of CBAs in effect, perhaps
due to the private nature of contracts in general, and the fact that each CBA is
generally negotiated by a different coalition of advocates in different cities. The
Partnership for Working Families database is the most centralized and updated
database that is readily available, which is why this database is used to provide the
most accurate number of currently active CBAs. In 2011, the Public Law Center
published a document outlining 18 major CBAs. See DANIEL J. LASALLE, PUB. L.
CTR., SUMMARY AND INDEX OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS (2011),
https://law.tulane.edu/sites/law.tulane.edu/files/Files/TPLC/summary-and-indexcommunity-benefit-agreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PAU-RX77]. See also Amy
Lavine,
Community
Benefits
Agreements,
BLOGSPOT,
http://community
benefits.blogspot.com/ [https://perma.cc/WRB9-GWC9], for a blog maintained by
CBA scholar Amy Lavine that provides details about 28 CBAs.
24. See Salkin & Lavine, Understanding CBAs, supra note 2, at 294.
25. See, e.g., Gurgol, supra note 3, at 479 (explaining that CBAs provide an
avenue for developers to minimize unnecessary delay caused by community action).
26. JULIAN GROSS, GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, GOOD JOBS FIRST
& CAL. P’SHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 2–3 (2005).
27. Id. at 2.
28. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 1, at 193 (outlining typical community group
commitments, including “release of legal claims”).
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Sometimes government agencies are party to the agreements, but
this has raised constitutional problems, so that is less typical than
the agreements between community organizations and
developers.29 In the last decade or so, prominent political leaders
have also voiced their support for CBAs.30
B. Common CBA Terms and Examples
One key benefit of CBAs is that they are flexible to the needs
of a particular community, so terms are likely to vary greatly in
these agreements. However, there are several terms that are
common across a wide variety of agreements:31
• Local hiring and contracting provisions;
• Affordable housing requirements;
• Job preparation and training programs for local residents;
• Environmental protections;
• Agreements for community organizations not to sue
developers; and
• Agreements for community organizations to publicly
support the project.
Depending on the project and its specific impacts, contracting
parties can tailor the agreements to fit their needs.

29. There appears to be an academic consensus on the idea that CBAs, when the
government is a party, are subject to analysis under the exactions doctrine, which
requires that constraints on development projects need an “essential nexus” with
developer land use and promoting land use regulations. See Amy Lavine, Legal &
Contractual Issues of Community Benefits Agreements, 32 ZONING & PLANNING L.
REPORT (2009) (analyzing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), which developed the exactions doctrine);
see also Gurgol, supra note 3, at 495 (arguing that a CBA would be subject to this
analysis and that it may be difficult for the community to show a rational
relationship and an essential nexus to a public purpose for some conditions); Gross,
supra note 1, at 196 (noting that any government involvement, including by use of a
CBA ordinance, would be subject to this analysis).
30. Gavin Newsom, current California Governor and former San Francisco
Mayor, expressed his support for CBAs in 2008, saying “building support for a large,
mixed-use project in a disadvantaged neighborhood is a real challenge . . . . By
bringing a coalition of labor and community groups to the table, the CBA process
built trust, support, and credibility for this vital project.” Gross, supra note 1, at 190.
Lori Lightfoot, current Chicago Mayor, and other Chicago mayoral candidates also
expressed support for CBAs during the 2019 Chicago mayoral elections. Editorial
Board, Lori Lightfoot, Toni Preckwinkle and the Obama Center: Locking in Benefits
for the South Side Makes Sense, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-obama-center-cba-light
foot-preckwinkle-20190227-story.html [https://perma.cc/3UV6-7TQX].
31. See, e.g., Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies in
Effect, supra note 18 (describing twenty current CBAs in effect).
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A recent example of a CBA is the Nashville MLS Soccer
Community Benefits Agreement, negotiated in response to plans to
construct a new soccer stadium in Nashville, Tennessee, and to
construct a related mixed-use development adjacent to the
stadium.32 This CBA was an agreement between Nashville Soccer
Holdings, the entity which will operate the Nashville stadium and
manage the team, and an organization called Stand Up Nashville,
which represented the interest of Nashville community
organizations,33 regarding the development of the mixed-use parcel
of land specifically.34 The parties reached the agreement in 2018,
with the CBA containing several typical provisions including
affordable housing,35 reservation of space for childcare facilities and
other community spaces,36 and minimum wage requirements.37
It also contains unique provisions that are particular to this
development; for example, the agreement requires Nashville Soccer
Holdings officials, coaches, and players to donate soccer equipment
to local schools, host soccer clinics, and visit schools to promote
“good sportsmanship and character development.”38 The
32. Historic Community Benefits Agreement Reached!, STAND UP NASHVILLE
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://standupnashville.org/historic-community-benefits-agree
ment-reached/ [https://perma.cc/2Y72-QH5P].
33. Stand Up Nashville’s member organizations are the Central Labor Council;
the International Association of Bridges, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing
Iron Workers; the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades; Nashville
Organized for Action and Hope (NOAH); the Laborers’ International Union of North
America (LiUNA!); Partnership for Working Families; and the Service Employees
International Union. Members, STAND UP NASHVILLE, https://standupnashville.org/
members/ [https://perma.cc/92HX-3VEF].
34. Nashville MLS Soccer Community Benefits Agreement (effective Sept. 3,
2018) [hereinafter Nashville Soccer CBA], available at https://www.forwork
ingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/18-09-03%20FINAL%20NSH-SUN%20CBA%20wi
th%20REVISED%20Exhibit%20A%20-%20SIGNED%20%2800456717xAA7B8%29
.PDF [https://perma.cc/S2A5-EPQX].
35. Id. at 4 (“NSH voluntarily agrees that a minimum of 12% of the residential
units within the Development shall be set aside for households earning 60% of the
AMI/MHI . . . . NSH further voluntarily agrees that (i) an additional 4% of the
residential units within the Development shall be set aside for households earning
between 61% and 80%, and (ii) an additional 4% of the residential units within the
Development shall be set aside for households earning between 81% and 120% of
AMI/MHI . . . .”).
36. Id. at 2 (“NSH will cause Developer to reserve no less than 4,000 sq. ft. within
or in close proximity to the Development for a childcare location . . . . NSH will cause
Developer to reserve 4,000 sq. ft. of retail space to the establishment of a micro-unit
incubator for the use of artisans and small business merchants . . . .”).
37. Id. at 5 (“NSH will direct hire employees . . . and pay such employees at least
$15.50 per hour.”).
38. Id. at 3 (“NSH will donate new or used soccer equipment and accessories to
elementary schools, middle schools and high schools located within Metro that have
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agreement, which requires at least thirty years of occupancy and
use,39 is an example of the value of CBAs. Not only was the
community coalition able to negotiate economic benefits, but it was
also aware of the particular needs of the community, and the parties
were able to contract in a way that took those community needs into
account. The stadium was approved by the city of Nashville in
February 2020 and is expected to be built by May 2022.40 Nashville
Mayor John Cooper stated that he was “fully supportive of the
community benefits agreement,” and both the city and the
developer respected the terms of the agreement while negotiating
about the exact boundaries of the mixed-use development.41 Most
notably, the CBA was critical to gaining the full support of
Nashville City Council members who voted on the development.42
The community-focused formation of this agreement, its tailored
terms, and its influence on city decisions all make the Nashville
MLS Soccer CBA a helpful example in understanding the formation
and importance of these agreements.
C. CBA Effectiveness
Several researchers have found that CBAs are an effective
tool, because they provide real benefits to community members,
such as increased wages,43 and they tend to provide these
an active soccer program . . . [,] will host an annual coaching clinic located within
Metro . . . [, and] shall visit, not less than eight (8) times per year, local elementary
schools throughout Metro to promote good sportsmanship and character
development.”).
39. Id. at 2.
40. Drake Hills, Nashville SC’s Stadium Construction Continues with Steel
Beam Installation, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.tenn
essean.com/story/sports/nashvillesc/2021/01/29/nashville-sc-first-steel-beam-soccerstadium-installed-fairgrounds/4262136001/ [https://perma.cc/U8YQ-9XYP].
41. Yihyun Jeong, ‘We Are Out of Time’: Ingram Blasts Mayor John Cooper on
Stalled
MLS
Stadium,
NASHVILLE
TENNESSEAN
(Jan.
31,
2020),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/31/mls-stadium-nashvillesc-owner-john-ingram-blasts-mayor-cooper-over-stalled-plans/4628151002/ [https://
perma.cc/JFQ2-BS6T].
42. Meg Garner, One Year Later, New Committee Launched to Oversee Critical
Piece of Nashville’s MLS Stadium Deal, NASHVILLE BUS. J. (Dec. 26, 2019),
https://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/news/2019/12/26/one-year-later-newcommittee-launched-to-oversee.html [https://perma.cc/5CHG-AGDW] (“Signing a
community benefits agreement was a critical component in persuading several
council members to originally endorse the stadium deal, which received pushback
after it was revealed the team’s owners would build a mixed-use development on 10
acres of city-owned land neighboring the stadium.”).
43. Harold Meyerson, No Justice, No Growth: How L.A. Makes Developers Create
Decent Jobs, 14 RACE, POVERTY & ENV’T 58, 60 (2007) (“CBAs . . . have plainly
boosted the wages of the construction workers . . . . Between 2000 and 2006, 104,000
construction jobs and 113,000 permanent jobs were covered under CBAs . . . .”).
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community benefits efficiently by lowering transaction costs
associated with disputes between developers and community
advocates.44 Others have pointed out the potential pitfalls with
CBAs, such as vague contract language and no effective
accountability measures, which can be avoided with careful
drafting, and argue that effectiveness is tied to thoughtful execution
and planning during the CBA formation process.45 It is also
important to note that developers often resist these agreements,
because they claim to not need accountability measures in order to
make a positive impact on local community members.46 Further,
some critics point out that it is impossible for CBAs to address the
needs of every community member, and the terms therefore may
not be as inclusive as they appear.47

44. Edward W. De Barbieri, Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit
Communities?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1773–74 (2016) (arguing that private
CBAs work “more efficiently than existing government processes” and that the
benefits negotiated by representative community groups enhance civic engagement).
But see Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not the
Antidote, of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 355, 356–57 (2013)
(calling CBAs “a redundancy that leads to additional costs for both developers and
community members” and finding that CBAs are generally overly favorable to
developers).
45. See CMTY. BENEFITS L. CTR., supra note 11 (finding that successful CBAs are
tied to transparent and inclusive processes with specific contracts, and less
successful CBAs are vague and lack accountability measures); see also Gross, supra
note 1, at 198 (“Because the value of a CBA lies in its inclusiveness and
accountability, CBAs that fall short in these areas rightly come in for criticism.”).
46. In one example, the company Tesco asserted that a CBA was unnecessary,
even after pressure from the community, because Tesco “already provides wellpaying jobs, has environmentally-friendly policies, and has pledged to locate stores
in underserved areas.” Salkin & Lavine, Understanding CBAs, supra note 2, at 319.
President Barack Obama was also opposed to a CBA for his presidential library on
the South Side of Chicago, primarily due to his concerns that it would be impossible
to include all community voices. President Obama emphasized that the Obama
Foundation was a nonprofit, implying that his motives were not financial, and that
he was “not an outsider here . . . . I know that the minute you start saying, well we’re
thinking about signing something . . . next thing I know I’ve got 20 organizations
that are coming out of the woodwork . . . . [W]e want to work with everybody in a
transparent way.” Pete Grieve, Obama Explains Why He Won’t Sign Community
Agreement for Presidential Center, CHICAGO MAROON (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.chicagomaroon.com/article/2017/9/15/obama-explains-presidentialcenter-sign-community/ [https://perma.cc/S9BU-5AJA].
47. See, e.g., Christine A. Fazio & Judith Wallace, Legal and Policy Issues
Related to Community Benefits Agreements, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 551–
52 (2010) (raising the concern that one “challenge is how to ensure that the groups
that benefit fairly represent the community”); Steven M. Seigel, Community Benefits
Agreements in a Union City: How the Structure of CBAs May Result in Inefficient,
Unfair Land Use Decisions, 46 URB. L. 419 (2014) (arguing that labor groups hold
disproportionate power in CBA negotiations).
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II. Community Benefits Agreement Enforceability Is An
Open Question
A key question regarding Community Benefits Agreements
that has not been addressed in detail is whether CBAs are
enforceable in court. Though the answer to this question depends to
a certain extent on the terms of an individual contract and on state
law, commentators have raised general enforceability concerns that
could apply to many CBAs.48 This Note will focus on three main
issues of enforceability. The first issue is whether community
organizations provide adequate consideration in agreements with
developers. The second issue is how to treat any subsequent parties
to the agreement in the event that a developer sells or leases space.
The third issue is who the intended beneficiaries are in these
agreements, and whether or not certain potential third-party
beneficiaries have standing to enforce these agreements. This Note
will use the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and select state law,
as there is currently no case law regarding the enforceability of
CBAs, to show that legal standards favor the general enforceability
of Community Benefits Agreements in each of these areas.
A.

Consideration

Experts have raised consideration as a potential enforceability
issue from the standpoint of a community organization entering an
agreement with a developer.49 Consideration is a critical component
of contract formation and generally refers to the idea that, for a
contract to be valid, the promises must be “bargained for,” meaning
that parties must exchange promises of performance with each
other.50 In a typical CBA, the consideration provided by the
48. See Lavine, supra note 29 (raising several enforceability concerns including
consideration, successors in interest, and government involvement); see also, e.g.,
Charlotte Clarke, Community Benefits Agreements: To the Extent Possible, 6 J. LAND
& DEV. 33, 45–47 (2016) (arguing that CBAs lack enforceability due to lack of
standing for community members, legal uncertainties regarding future parties, and
vague provisions); Fazio & Wallace, supra note 47, at 553–54 (questioning standing
and successorship and arguing that CBAs need to go further to govern enforcement
and monitoring).
49. See Gross, supra note 1, at 193 (noting that observers have raised this
question and hypothesizing that “the persistence of this concern stems from the
novelty of the real-world bargain made by the parties”); Lavine, supra note 29 (“This
bargain can at times seem lopsided, given the relative monetary worth of these
promises, and for this reason, the question has been raised whether CBAs are
supported by adequate consideration.”).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“(1) To
constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.
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developer includes most of the substantive terms that encompass
the nature of the agreement as one that provides benefits to a
community: affordable housing requirements, hiring provisions,
environmental covenants, and other terms negotiated by the
parties.51
The more contentious part of the bargain is the consideration
provided by the community organizations, which is typically an
agreement to not bring a lawsuit preventing the development, to
publicly support the development, or simply to not publicly
disparage the development.52 The major concern is that community
organizations are not actually giving something up to take part in
these agreements, and the agreements solely benefit those
organizations. William Valletta, the former City Planning
Commission general counsel of New York City, said of the Atlantic
Yards CBA at a town hall event: “What is the community giving up
in order to take part in the agreement? Presumably, they can’t sell
their vote or their participation in democracy.”53 This argument is
likely getting at the fact that, most commonly, community
organizations exchange a promise to speak positively about the
projects in city meetings or to the press rather than exchanging
money or particular services. This aspect of CBAs has not yet been
litigated, but current law on consideration can be used to analyze
common CBA provisions regarding community organization
promises and whether or not they are likely to be adequate
consideration.

(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor
in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
promise. (3) The performance may consist of (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a
forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation. (4)
The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other
person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other person.”).
51. See CMTY. BENEFITS L. CTR., supra note 11, at 7 (discussing typical terms of
effective CBAs).
52. Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and
Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 36, 46 (2007).
53. Lavine, supra note 29 (citing Matthew Schuerman, The C.B.A. at Atlantic
Yards: But Is It Legal?, OBSERVER (Mar. 14, 2006), https://observer.com/2006/03/thecba-at-atlantic-yards-but-is-it-legal [https://perma.cc/L9DT-VAQY]); see also Naved
Sheikh, Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private Contracts Replace Public
Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 233 (2008) (“[Legal experts]
doubt that the promise given by community groups to give up their democratic right
to object or by their members to give up their right as citizens to vote against a project
constitutes a valid promise at all.”).
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B. Successors and Delegation of Duty
Another open issue about CBA enforceability is what happens
once the original developer inevitably sells or leases part of the
development property. Practitioners in the CBA space have
addressed the fact that a successor or delegee in a CBA could have
a number of different legal treatments and responsibilities,54 and
that absent specific contractual language outlining these legal
relationships, courts will have to decide whether the agreements
within the contract will carry with the land or if they were specific
to the original developer party to the agreement.55
This Note will address the contractual language that could
lead to a variety of different legal treatments. Successors in interest
may assume the entirety of the obligations under the agreement,
they may have no obligations at all, or the developers may retain
some obligations.
C. Third-Party Beneficiaries
Finally, this Note will address the legal questions presented
by a third-party beneficiary analysis of CBAs. The direct parties to
the agreement, the developer and signing community
organizations, should have clear standing to enforce the CBA.56
However, since the agreement purports to benefit the entire
community, there is an argument that anyone who is part of the
community may have standing to sue to enforce a CBA.57 A
beneficiary of a contract is someone who can fairly be interpreted to
have a right to performance under the contract,58 so individual
community members could qualify. Part V will discuss whether this
interpretation is possible and whether it is beneficial.

54. Gross, supra note 1, at 194 (“From a legal perspective, some of these parties
may be successors-in-interest, some may be assignees, some may be agents, and
some may simply be parties to a relevant contractual relationship . . . .”).
55. Lavine, supra note 29 (recommending contract language that clarifies how
each business will be responsible under the CBA).
56. Id. at 4–5 (clarifying that while it is beneficial to have multiple community
organizations sign the agreement to ensure its enforceability in case of dissolution,
the agreement should be enforceable by any signing party).
57. Id. at 4.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 302 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“(1) Unless
otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an
intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the performance
of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the
beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. (2) An incidental beneficiary is
a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.”).
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One commentator has pointed out that there is some authority
that is not directly on point in this area but can be used as an
analogy to show that community members would have standing in
court to enforce a CBA.59 In the highlighted cases, the Oregon Court
of Appeals found that members of a homeowners association had
standing to enforce an agreement regarding road improvements
between a developer and the county, and the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held that employees had standing to
enforce lunch break requirements promised under a collective
bargaining agreement since the agreement was meant to protect
the employees.60 Similarly, CBAs often include provisions that have
the purpose of directly benefitting individual community members
rather than the community more generally, so those individuals
may have standing to bring a claim to enforce agreements.61
The Partnership for Working Families, a national network of
economic-focused organizations, maintains a list of CBAs currently
in effect.62 This list includes links to fifteen CBAs63 which were used
to provide the information about common contract terms in Parts
III–V of this Note.64
III. Community Benefits Agreements Likely to Contain
Adequate Consideration
A. Common Terms
Terms describing consideration have the most variation
within example contracts, perhaps because they may be tailored to
the size and abilities of the community groups or coalitions involved
in the CBA. Some provisions are very comprehensive, and several
elements are common on their own or as a group of requirements:

59. Lavine, supra note 29.
60. Id.
61. Id. (“[A] local job applicant would have a better chance of demonstrating
standing to sue if the employer failed to honor a local hiring provision in a CBA than
would a neighborhood resident seeking enforcement of a CBA provision with more
dispersed beneficiaries, such as a requirement to build a park.”).
62. Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies in Effect, supra
note 18.
63. Though this list contains information about 19 CBAs, only 15 of the CBAs on
the list have a valid link to their specific CBA language. Therefore, this Note
analyzes the language of those 15 CBAs.
64. To collect information to inform Parts III–V of this Note, I analyzed the terms
of each CBA related to consideration, successors and assigns, and third-party
beneficiaries. I categorized the relevant terms to create groups of terms, and these
groups are analyzed collectively in Parts III–V.
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letters of support and testimony, public comment requirements,
agreements not to sue, and implementation committees.
The Bayview Hunters Point CBA requires that the community
organizations send a letter of support to any public body requested
by the Developer, and it has an example of the language required
in the letter:
This letter states [Organization’s] support of the integrated
development of the Hunters Point Shipyard and Candlestick
Point . . . . We are proud to join with so many community-based
organizations and leaders . . . in support of this Project . . . .
[Organization] and the other community-based organizations
that signed the CBA believe that the Project provides strong,
enforceable commitments on issues of major importance to the
community. [Organization] therefore urges the developer, the
City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency, and all community members to resolve
all issues in a way that . . . allows this important project to be
built in a financially feasible manner.65

The same CBA also requires testimony to the Redevelopment
Agency of San Francisco or the city’s Board of Supervisors, or other
hearings upon request: “If requested by Developer in writing with
at least five days’ notice, at least one Lead Organization shall send
at least one representative knowledgeable about the Project to
speak in support of the Project . . . .”66
Some CBAs limit the ability of the community organizations
to speak publicly about the project. For example, the Marlton
Square CBA requires the following:
From and after the date of mutual execution of this CBP, the
Coalition shall not make statements in the media, in public
forums, to public officials or their staffs, or to community groups
or other organizations, opposing land sales or approvals related
to the Marlton Square Development Project. Notwithstanding
the above, the Coalition may publicly support the inclusion of
this CBP into a Development Agreement.67

Almost every agreement provides for the creation of an
implementation committee, tasked with meeting on a regular basis
to review plans and progress. The terms of these types of conditions
65. Core Community Benefits Agreement: Hunters Point Shipyard/Candlestick
Point Integrated Development Project, Attachment B Support Letter (effective May
30, 2008) [hereinafter Bayview Hunters Point CBA], available at
https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/documents/BayviewHuntersP
ointCBA.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NSW-UHXU].
66. Id. at 14.
67. Marlton Square Redevelopment Project Developer Community Benefits
Program, 11 (effective 2002) [hereinafter Marlton Square CBA], available at
https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/documents/cba_marltonsquar
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3BD-XEQ6].
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vary from agreement to agreement, but the Staples Center CBA
provides an example of common language:
To assist with implementation of this Community Benefits
Program, address environmental concerns and facilitate an
ongoing dialogue between the Coalition and the Developer, the
Coalition and the Developer shall establish a working group of
representatives of the Coalition and the Developer, known as
the Advisory Committee. This Advisory Committee shall meet
quarterly, unless it is mutually agreed that less frequent
meetings are appropriate. Among other issues, the Developer
shall seek the input of the Advisory Committee in the
Developer’s preparation of the construction management plan,
the traffic management plan, the waste management plan and
the neighborhood traffic protection plan. In addition, the
Developer shall seek the input of the Advisory Committee in a
[sic] effort to develop and implement potential solutions to other
environmental concerns, including without limitation,
pedestrian safety, air quality and green building principles.68

Finally, provisions that limit the ability of community
organizations to sue, or that require withdrawal of pending claims,
also appear in agreements as exemplified in the Hill District CBA:
The Coalition will (i) cause the Notice of Appeal to be
discontinued and dismissed with prejudice, and (ii) cause all
other Appellants to the Notice of Appeal to discontinue and
dismiss same with prejudice . . . . The Releasing Parties hereby
knowingly, irrevocably and unconditionally waive, and are
hereby deemed to have waived, any and all Released Claims
that may arise or relate to the acts or obligations of the Released
Parties prior to the date of this Agreement that do not come to
the actual attention of the Releasing Parties until after the date
of this Agreement, unless concealed by one or more of the
Released Parties . . . . This Release and Waiver of Claims shall
also constitute a covenant not to sue in the future by the
Coalition or any of the other Releasing Parties, or anyone acting
on their behalf or for their benefit, as to any matter that would
come within the definition of a Released Claim.69

These terms, along with a situation in which no potential
consideration is addressed in a CBA, are analyzed in the following
section.

68. Community Benefits Program for the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment
District Project, A-13 (effective May 2001), available at https://www.forworkingfa
milies.org/sites/default/files/documents/StaplesCBA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MHDFDRL].
69. In this CBA, “Released Claims” include actions of public officials related to
the development. Hill District Community Benefits Agreement, 14–15 (effective Aug.
19, 2008) [hereinafter Hill District CBA], available at https://www.forworkingfa
milies.org/sites/default/files/documents/HillDistrictCBA.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM
E8-2KVM].
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B. Analysis of Terms
1. Letters of Support and Testimony; Public Comments
These forms of consideration are analyzed together because
they involve affirmative actions on the part of the community
organization.70 The main enforceability question for these promises
is whether they are adequate in comparison with the consideration
provided by developers in CBAs.71 It is common for CBAs to include
several pages of promises that the developer makes, often requiring
significant time or money, while only providing for one or two
paragraphs of community organization requirements. For example,
the Bayview Hunters Point CBA referenced above, which includes
one of the more comprehensive descriptions of community
organization obligations, still appears to be imbalanced—the
contract contains provisions about affordable housing, workforce
development, and employment, which all require significant
investment from the developer.72 Though the community
organization does have obligations, the time and energy required is
likely to be far less.
Several sections of the Second Restatement of Contracts are
relevant here. First, Section 72 states that “any performance which
is bargained for is consideration.”73 The comments clarify that the
consideration does not have to have an equal economic value to the
promise, but rather things like duress or undue influence may make
consideration invalid.74 This is unlikely to be an issue because of the
sophisticated bargaining position of most developers. Based on the
basics outlined in this section of the Restatement, the exchange
present in most CBAs for public support in exchange for CBA
promises would appear to be valid.75
70. Lavine, supra note 29 (asserting that CBAs that impose affirmative
obligations should be more likely to have adequate consideration).
71. Several commentators have raised the question of adequacy of consideration.
See supra discussion accompanying note 49.
72. Bayview Hunters Point CBA, supra note 65.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 72 (AM. L. INST. 1981). Many courts
have affirmed this principle; see, e.g., Design Benefit Plans v. Enright, 940 F. Supp.
200, 206 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (asserting that the parties likely could not bring a lack of
consideration argument because of the “broad definition of consideration” in §§ 71
and 72); Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Miller, 432 F. Supp. 2d 822, 845
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (affirming the principle in Restatement Section 72, and finding that
even if defendants had raised a consideration concern, it would not have impacted
enforceability).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 72 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1981).
75. CBA expert Julian Gross adopts this argument and begins and ends his
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Section 79 of the Restatement addresses adequacy of
consideration, which is also relevant in this analysis.76 First, it is
important that the Restatement notes that courts ordinarily do not
inquire as to the adequacy of the consideration because of the fact
that parties often assign their own values to the deal, and many
promises are in fact intangible and difficult to place in terms of
market value.77 The promises of community organizations in CBAs
certainly fall under this category because it is hard to put a price on
the value of public testimony, and it will vary in every individual
case. For example, if the community organization testimony is
essential to gaining a building permit, that may be invaluable to a
developer. If, however, the development is likely to be approved
regardless, the testimony may be less important. For this reason,
Restatement Section 79 is important because it emphasizes the fact
that the parties assign value to the consideration, not the courts,
and in this case that would weigh in favor of enforceability.
Finally, Section 80 of the Restatement clarifies that “two or
more promises may be binding even though made for the price of
one” as long as the one promise is adequate consideration.78 Since
the community organizations’ promises to act are likely to be
considered adequate consideration, the fact that one of these actions
may be promised in exchange for several actions on the part of the
developer would not render the consideration invalid.
Overall, though there is potentially an imbalance in the
consideration provided between parties, the consideration if
bargained for should be considered as valid. So, in CBAs which
analysis of consideration in the CBA context with the principle that consideration is
valid if bargained for, so this should not be a barrier to CBA enforcement. Gross,
supra note 1, at 191.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 79 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“If the
requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of (a) a gain,
advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or detriment to the
promisee; or (b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or (c) ‘mutuality of
obligation.’”); see also Rosenbaum v. DataCom Sys., No. 13 Civ. 5484 (PKC), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18730, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2014) (dismissing the argument
that one party did not provide “full consideration” to the other and finding
consideration existed even when the value of the exchange was mismatched).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 79, cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“To the
extent that the apportionment of productive energy and product in the economy are
left to private action, the parties to transactions are free to fix their own
valuations . . . . [I]n many situations there is no reliable external standard of value,
or the general standard is inappropriate to the precise circumstances of the
parties . . . . Ordinarily, therefore, courts do not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration. This is particularly so when one or both of the values exchanged are
uncertain or difficult to measure. But it is also applied even when it is clear that the
transaction is a mixture of bargain and gift.”).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 80 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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provide that community organizations must publicly support the
project in one or more of a variety of ways, consideration is not likely
to be an enforceability issue.79
2. Implementation Committees
Many CBA agreements provide for the creation of
implementation committees, which meet regularly to assess the
progress of the CBA terms. Even in CBAs with no other provisions
for consideration, these agreements very often still provide for an
implementation committee, so the question is whether a community
organization is providing adequate consideration by agreeing to
serve on one of these committees.
Though the terms analyzed in the prior section can be
described as promises, the Restatement provides that an act other
than a promise can be consideration.80 In this case, the act by the
community organization would be the time, energy, and effort spent
preparing for and attending community meetings.81 The above
analysis about adequacy of consideration applies here as well;
typically, the parties and not a court would determine whether
consideration is adequate, and the sophistication of the developer is
likely enough to preclude any finding that CBA agreements
providing for implementation committees lack consideration.
3. Agreements Not to Sue
Only two CBAs included an agreement not to sue.82 In most
cases, this provision would be recognized as a promise to forbear
rather than to act.83 The community organization is agreeing to not
79. Critics of CBA enforceability have also raised the issue that individuals
cannot provide their participation in democracy as consideration. See discussion at
supra note 53. The analysis of adequacy and validity of consideration applies to this
criticism as well. As long as the consideration is bargained for and freely given,
courts will typically not inquire as to the adequacy of that consideration, and it
should be considered to be valid.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“(3) The
performance may consist of (a) an act other than a promise . . . .”).
81. The Restatement is clear, and case law confirms, that performance can be
consideration. See id.; see also Dr.’s Assocs. v. Alemayehu, 934 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir.
2019) (finding that consideration was adequate by adopting the performance
standard outlined in § 71).
82. Hill District CBA, supra note 69, at 4; Ballpark Village Project Community
Benefits Agreement, 14 (effective Sept. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Ballpark Village CBA],
available at https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/documents/Ballpa
rk%20CBA.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3G5-687Y].
83. There are certain instances, such as in the Hill District CBA, supra note 69,
at 14–15, where the community organization agrees to withdraw claims currently
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bring a claim against the developer in exchange for the developer’s
various promises. So, the first issue is whether forbearance is valid
consideration; the Restatement makes it clear that it is.84 The more
complex question was raised by CBA scholar Amy Lavine: a
potential claim must actually be valid in order for forbearance in
this situation to be valid consideration.85 Restatement Section 74
clarifies that forbearance to assert an invalid claim is not
consideration unless the claim is doubtful, or the party reasonably
believes the claim is valid.86 So, the question of consequence is
whether the potential claims brought by a community organization
would be valid.
This question can be answered by examining past lawsuits
brought by community organizations or activists against
developers. It is important to note that both of the analyzed
agreements that included this term also prevent community
organizations from taking action against local governments related
to the development and its approval.87 With this issue specifically,
lawsuits are not infrequent. One organization in Los Angeles,
California, sued the city, saying that a new development violated
its municipal code.88 A California group called CaRLA frequently
sues cities over planned developments, particularly those not
compliant with housing laws or zoning standards.89 At least one of
CaRLA’s cases resulted in a legal victory, three cases settled, and
several are ongoing but have gained legal victories along the way.90
CaRLA’s advocacy demonstrates that community groups likely
have standing to sue cities in matters related to developments, at
least in some cases, and that they will do so. There certainly are
outstanding. In this case, withdrawing the claim might be an action. However, in
cases where litigation is not underway, this term would be forbearance rather than
action.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“(1) To constitute
consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for . . . .(3) The
performance may consist of . . . (b) a forbearance.”).
85. Lavine, supra note 29.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 74 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also
Lavine, supra note 29; Hakim v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 272 F.3d 932, 935–36
(7th Cir. 2001) (“Even if, in hindsight, the legal claim was improbable or nonexistent,
‘it would be enough if at the time of [agreement] [the party] believed in good faith it
was vulnerable to a claim by [the other party.]’”).
87. Hill District CBA, supra note 69; Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 82.
88. CCED Chinatown, Chinatown Fights Market-Rate Development, KNOCK LA
(May 20, 2019), https://knock-la.com/chinatown-fights-market-rate-developmentdd909d79a73a [https://perma.cc/J62B-SPDB].
89. CARLA, https://carlaef.org/ [https://perma.cc/DE8W-DXN6].
90. CARLA, Our Work, https://carlaef.org/about-us/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/
5LD5-H6RZ].
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valid claims that community organizations could bring, so agreeing
to forbear from any related claims appears to be valid consideration.
Overall, as long as the agreement purports to waive claims
that would otherwise be valid, agreements not to sue are a
legitimate form of consideration.
4. No Explicit Terms
Of the analyzed contracts, only two lacked a provision about
community organization obligations and creation of an
implementation committee.91 In these cases, the contracts outline
several obligations for the developer, omitting obligations for the
community organization. The question here is whether the
agreement can still be seen to be supported by consideration.
Restatement Section 71 says that “the creation, modification,
or destruction of a legal relation” can be a performance that
constitutes consideration.92 So, the mere fact that the parties are
entering into a contract together could be sufficient consideration,
even though in this situation, the relative worth of the consideration
may be even more imbalanced than in prior analysis of CBA terms.
Restatement Section 79 also adds that courts will not ordinarily
inquire into an imbalanced exchange “when it is clear that the
transaction is a mixture of bargain and gift.”93 It is possible that
CBAs with no clear community organization obligations could be
viewed as a partial gift that will bring goodwill to the community.
Further, even if the community organization has no formal
obligations under the agreement, the developer can use the
organization’s credibility in the community to emphasize to
community members that the developer should be seen positively
and does have formal support from community groups. This
credibility alone is arguably a benefit to the developer, even without
more from the community organization.
Overall, it is likely that even in the case of no explicit
consideration terms, a CBA would not be unenforceable for lack of
consideration.

91. Community Benefits Program Lorenzo Project (effective Feb. 2011)
[hereinafter Lorenzo Palmer CBA], available at https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/
sites/default/files/resources/Web_LorenzoPalmer%20CBP.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDF
2-PLED]; Operations Jobs Policy Oakland Army Base Project West Gateway
(effective Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/
documents/OABWestGateway.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP4J-8RD2].
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71(3)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 79 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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IV. Successors and Delegation of Duty Greatly Depend on
Contractual Language
A. Common Terms
Of the three terms in CBAs most subject to enforceability
critiques, a term regarding successors and delegation of duties was
the most likely to be included in contracts. Of the fifteen contracts
analyzed, only one was silent about the treatment of successors and
assigns.94 The remainder of the agreements included terms that
either contain detailed definitions of successors and delegation of
duty, or brief boilerplate language.
The Ballpark Village CBA, a retail and housing development
near the San Diego Padres stadium in San Diego, California,
contains some of the most detailed language defining successors
and assigns:
This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit
of ACCORD, Member Organizations, ACCORD’s Successors,
and Successors to any Successors of ACCORD . . . Developer’s
Successors include, but are not limited to, any party who
obtains an Interest, vertical developers, retail developers,
contractors, management companies, and owners’ or retail
merchants’ associations participating in the Project. Upon
conveyance of an Interest to an entity in compliance with
Section 9.4, ACCORD may enforce the obligations under this
Agreement with respect to that Interest only against such
entity, and neither Developer nor any owner of a different
Interest shall be liable for any breach of such obligations by
such entity or its Successors. Except as otherwise indicated in
this Section 9.3, references in this Agreement to a party shall
be deemed to apply to any successor in interest, transferee,
assign, agent, representative, of that party.95

In addition to this language, the contract includes terms for which
the developer will continue to be liable, even upon transfer or
assign, including affordable housing, funding for an economic
impact study, and funding for arts and culture.96
Many more agreements contained language that can be
described as “boilerplate” and addresses successors and assigns
very generally. For example, a CBA for the new Milwaukee Bucks
basketball stadium in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, simply provides: “The

94. See Lorenzo Palmer CBA, supra note 91.
95. Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 82.
96. Id.
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Developer agrees that the terms of this agreement shall be
applicable to any successor, assignee or transferee of Developer.”97
Most contracts contained similar language. Some contracts
also included language that all covenants run with the land.98
B. Analysis of Terms
1. Detailed Definitions of Successors and Assigns,
Boilerplate Language, and Obligations Running
with the Land
Many contracts address whether obligations can be delegated
by the developers in CBAs; several contracts contained a very
detailed definition of successors and assigns, while others included
boilerplate language or a few specific terms. These variations are
analyzed together because in all cases, the language of the contract
is likely to guide the way each contract will be specifically enforced.
Restatement Section 318 says that in general, delegation of
duty is allowed unless it is against public policy or if the party has
a “substantial interest” in the original party’s performance of the
duty.99 The Restatement also allows the parties to discharge the
duties of the obligor with contractual language.100 An exception is
when duties involve personal services or the exercise of skill and
discretion.101

97. Agreement between Milwaukee Bucks LLC and the Alliance for Good Jobs
(effective May 12, 2016), available at https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/
default/files/resources/Bucks-AfGJ%20Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F9GCGJ37].
98. See, e.g., Hollywood and Vine Mixed-Use Development Project Community
Benefits Agreement (effective Apr. 2004) [hereinafter Hollywood and Vine CBA],
available at https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/documents/CBA
GatehouseFINAL5-7-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYK7-ZE2T] (“The provisions of this
Agreement are covenants that run with the land and bind all grantees, lessees or
other transferees thereto for the benefit of and in favor of the City, the CRA and the
Coalition.”).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 318 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 323 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (holding
otherwise, the default is that the obligor is still liable; a “purported promise by a
promisor ‘and his assigns’ does not mean that the promisor can terminate his duty
by making an assignment, nor does it of itself show an assumption of duties by any
assignee”).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 318 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also
Dimario v. Flextronics Am., LLC, No. 09-058 ML, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132230, at
*9 (D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2010) (citing the Restatement and adding that delegation is not
allowed when “anything other than personal performance would be unsatisfactory”);
see also Proriver, Inc. v. Red River Grill, LLC, 83 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51 (D.D.C. 1999)
(finding duties could be delegated to an assignee because no personal skill or
discretion by the assignor was required to fulfill its obligation).
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The critical question then becomes whether delegation of an
agreement would violate public policy or otherwise involve special
skill or discretion. There are a couple of examples in the analyzed
CBAs that may not be able to be delegated for these reasons. In the
Nashville Soccer CBA, one of the terms of the contract provides that
the coaches and players of the local professional soccer team must
visit elementary schools in the area.102 This provision of the contract
could likely not be delegated because it involves the special
connection of the parties to the soccer team, which may not exist
with a different party. However, the same agreement contains
provisions about affordable housing and workforce development.103
These provisions are more general and therefore could conceivably
be executed by sublessors or other successors in interest.
So, in the absence of policy reasons not to enforce delegation,
agreements with clear language addressing successors and assigns
are likely to be enforceable and the duties could successfully be
delegated to third parties. More detailed language can provide
additional protection for the developer such as terminating its duty
by making an assignment; this would likely not happen for a
contract which only includes the boilerplate terms.104 Covenants
running with the land may be particularly important as well.105
Overall, the language around delegation is likely to be enforced as
written absent special circumstances; because of the importance of
the drafting language, experts recommend that parties include
terms that are as detailed as possible.106 Julian Gross describes the
“flow-down” problem of successors and assigns in a CBA agreement
as the breaks in the contractual chain which can cause agreement
terms to go unfulfilled.107 Gross recommends detailed language to
ensure that each party down the chain of successors is made fully
aware of all obligations in order that the community groups are

102. Nashville Soccer CBA, supra note 34 (“The coaches, players and/or officials
of the NSH MLS team shall visit, not less than eight (8) times per year, local
elementary schools throughout Metro to promote good sportsmanship and character
development, with at least two (2) visits to elementary schools located in Promise
Zone communities.”).
103. Id.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 323 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
105. Lavine, supra note 29 (highlighting case law that implies that explicit
covenants running with the land are critical to CBA enforcement).
106. GROSS ET AL., supra note 26, at 55; see also Salkin & Lavine, Understanding
CBAs, supra note 2, at 326 (suggesting that CBAs should require that subsequent
parties sign a similar agreement to ensure enforceability).
107. GROSS ET AL., supra note 26, at 71.
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most seamlessly able to enforce CBA terms for any subsequent
party controlling the land.108
2. No Explicit Terms
It is rare, but not unheard of, that a CBA does not address
successors and assigns and is silent as to whether duties can be
delegated.109 If the developer wanted to delegate the duties under
the contract to a successor in interest, and expressly did so, this
would be clearly allowed under the Restatement.110 However, this
would most likely come up as an enforceability issue in the event
that the developer sells or leases the land without any attempt to
delegate its duties under the contract. In that case, the question is
whether any successor in interest would be bound to the terms of
the original contract. There is no provision for automatic delegation,
so the most likely situation is that the developer would be in breach
of the contract in this case.
V. Community Benefits Agreements May Enable Third
Party Beneficiary Claims
A. Common Terms
It is not uncommon for a CBA to contain no provision about
third party beneficiaries; many agreements are silent on this. The
agreements that do address it will typically outline the intended
third party beneficiaries—often a city or government—and provide
that those parties have the power to enforce the agreement. An
example of this language comes from the Marlton Square CBA:
Intended Beneficiaries. The City, the Agency, and the Coalition
are intended third-party beneficiaries of contracts and other
agreements which incorporate this CBP, with regard to the
terms and provisions of this CBP. The City, the Agency and the
Coalition shall each independently have the right to enforce the
provisions of this CBP against all parties incorporating this
CBP into contracts or other agreements.111

One CBA, the Hill District CBA regarding a new arena for the
Pittsburgh Penguins hockey team, contained a section titled “No
108. Id.
109. See Lorenzo Palmer CBA, supra note 91.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 318 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“An
obligor is discharged by the substitution of a new obligor only if the contract so
provides or if the obligee makes a binding manifestation of assent, forming a
novation. See §§ 280, 328 and 329. Otherwise, the obligee retains his original right
against the obligor, even though the obligor manifests an intention to substitute
another obligor in his place and the other purports to assume the duty.”).
111. Marlton Square CBA, supra note 67, at 9.
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Third Party Rights”: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to create any third party rights or benefits under any existing or
presently contemplated agreement between the SEA, the URA, the
Penguins Entities or any of their respective affiliates . . . .”112
Aside from these two examples, it was by far most common in
the analyzed agreements to see no provision regarding third party
beneficiaries. The following section will analyze the impact of each
of these drafting decisions on whether third parties may be able to
bring a claim to enforce the CBA agreement in question.
B. Analysis of Terms
1. Intended Third-Party Beneficiaries
Some contracts explicitly name third party beneficiaries, but
none of the examined contracts listed general community members
as beneficiaries. This applies to three of the contracts analyzed in
this Note.113 The question is whether the failure to include these
third parties in the list of intended beneficiaries would mean that
they are excluded and cannot have a right to enforce the agreement.
Though the Restatement is clear that a party does not have to
be explicitly included in order to have rights,114 whether a third
party can enforce a CBA may differ by state. A Fifth Circuit decision
provided that Texas law did not allow treatment of someone as a
third party when the contract explicitly included other parties but
excluded the party in question.115 Other courts have not addressed
this specific question, but the Texas decision is indicative that the
failure to include a particular group in a list of intended
beneficiaries could be evidence that they are not in fact intended
beneficiaries.
Overall, the exclusion of community members may prohibit
them from being able to enforce agreements. However, the limited
availability of claims to community members may actually be
advantageous in the long run. If developers are subject to claims

112. Hill District CBA, supra note 69, at 5.
113. Sunquest Industrial Park Project Community Benefits Plan (effective Oct.
25, 2001), available at https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/
documents/SunquestIndustrialParkProject.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9RX-MUDA];
Hollywood and Vine CBA, supra note 98; Marlton Square CBA, supra note 67.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 308 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
115. See Goldberg v. R.J. Longo Constr. Co., 54 F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted) (holding that “Longo’s claim to be a creditor beneficiary of the
agreement does not automatically fail simply because the agreement does not so
identify Longo. This agreement, however, identifies its intended beneficiaries
explicitly in paragraph 4 and Longo is not among them”).
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from hundreds or thousands of individuals, they may be less likely
to enter into CBAs in the first place. Limiting the group of people
who can enforce the agreement is not a surprising contractual term,
nor is it necessarily negative for CBAs overall.
2. Disclaimer of Third-Party Beneficiaries
Just one contract claimed that no third parties shall have
rights under the agreement.116 The question is whether parties are
able to contract away third-party beneficiaries.
This question is straightforward under the Restatement.
Restatement Section 302 outlines who is defined as an intended
beneficiary, but the provision starts with “[u]nless otherwise agreed
between promisor and promisee.”117 It is clear that, in the case
where a contract explicitly says there are no third-party rights, it
will be difficult to argue that there are.
3. No Explicit Terms
Many contracts had no specific terms regarding third party
rights.118 In the case of no specific terms, the question is whether
community members or other third parties are intended
beneficiaries, thus giving them the right to enforce the contracts, or
simply incidental beneficiaries with no right to enforcement.119
There is some case law in different contexts, such as homeowners
enforcing a homeowners’ association agreement, which has been
suggested to be analogous to this situation, that finds third party
beneficiaries do have the right to enforce this type of agreement.120
In addition, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides
further guidance. A party does not have to be explicitly recognized
in the contract to be an intended beneficiary.121 Generally, a party
is intended if “recognition of a right to performance in the
116. See Hill District CBA, supra note 69.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 302 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
118. This is somewhat unexpected given the assumption that developers would
want to limit claims from third parties when possible. This is particularly notable
since the answer to whether a community member can enforce a CBA is not clear,
and there is a high likelihood that enforceability will depend on the particular
situation and framing of the agreement. It is possible that not including this term
was negotiated by community organizations, or that developers were confident that
third party claims would be excluded.
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 304 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (providing
that intended beneficiaries may enforce duties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS.
§ 315 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (providing that an incidental beneficiary cannot enforce
duties).
120. See supra discussion accompanying notes 59–60.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 308 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties”
and either the performance will satisfy an obligation to pay money,
or “the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”122 Two
Restatement illustrations under Section 302 are helpful here. See
Illustration 10:
A, the operator of a chicken processing and fertilizer plant,
contracts with B, a municipality, to use B’s sewage system.
With the purpose of preventing harm to landowners
downstream from its system, B obtains from A a promise to
remove specified types of waste from its deposits into the
system. C, a downstream landowner, is an intended beneficiary
under Subsection (1)(b).123

This illustration is similar to the promises contained within a CBA.
Many promises have the primary purpose of protecting community
members as future employees of the developer, or providing a more
general benefit such as a community center or other investment.
One difference between this illustration and a CBA is that the group
of intended beneficiaries is relatively finite; it applies to
“landowners downstream” of the plant. In contrast, CBA
agreements may intend to benefit an entire community, which may
be more difficult to define—it may be hard to determine whether
the agreement covers a specific neighborhood, an entire city, or if
there is some other measure of “community.”
Illustration 14 is also helpful: “A, a labor union, enters into a
collective bargaining agreement with B, an employer, in which B
promises not to discriminate against any employee because of his
membership in A. All B’s employees who are members of A are
intended beneficiaries of the promise.”124 The biggest difference
between this illustration and a CBA, similar to the issue with
Illustration 10, is that with a labor union, all of the employees are
actually members of the labor union and therefore have a clearer
reason to be considered as intended beneficiaries.125 Most
community organizations creating CBAs represent the community
more generally, as discussed in the above paragraph.

122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 302 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 302 cmt. d, illus. 10 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 302 cmt. d, illus. 14 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
125. See Lavine, supra note 29 (describing cases of labor unions and homeowners’
associations where employees and homeowners, respectively, were found to be third
parties of agreements).
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The purpose of Community Benefits Agreements is to benefit
communities.126 There is no question that the terms in these
agreements were crafted to provide a benefit to the future
employees and residents of the area surrounding a particular
development. However, what differentiates CBAs from the
Restatement illustrations and prior case law is how finite and
definable the group is, and that is likely to be the argument against
enforcement of CBAs by third parties.127 CBA scholars Amy Lavine
and Patricia Salkin also raise the question of “whether CBAs are
intended to benefit individual persons, or whether they are
intended to benefit the community at large.”128
Depending on the agreement, it is very possible that the
community in question could be adequately finite and defined.
Describing the impacted “community” specifically may be helpful in
the event a third-party community member hopes to bring a claim
to enforce a CBA. Some CBAs do define community, or they
reference a specific geographic area in the contract.129 In such
agreements, there is a strong argument based on the Restatement
that third parties could bring a claim. Community members
attempting to enforce CBAs as third-party beneficiaries would also
have to argue that the agreements were meant to benefit
individuals in the community, rather than the community as a
whole. These individuals could point to provisions such as wage
requirements, affordable housing provisions, and job training
programs that are expressly targeted toward individual community
members. An agreement that contains many of these terms, as
opposed to terms focused on community spaces or development
funds, may be easier for a third-party community member to
enforce.130
Though courts have not decided on the question of third-party
community members enforcing a CBA,131 those individuals may
126. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 1, at 216; Salkin & Lavine, Understanding CBAs,
supra note 2, at 292.
127. See, e.g., Gurgol, supra note 3, at 493 (“Critics recognizing CBAs solely as
private contracts between developers and community interest groups aver
community members from the community at large will not be able to challenge the
CBA as a contract because the community is not an intended third-party
beneficiary.”).
128. Salkin & Lavine, Understanding CBAs, supra note 2, at 326.
129. See, e.g., Nashville Soccer CBA, supra note 34 (“This Nashville MLS Soccer
Community Benefits Agreement (‘Soccer CBA’) is made and executed . . . for the
benefit of the residents of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County . . . .”).
130. See also discussion at supra note 61.
131. This issue was raised, but not ultimately addressed, in litigation surrounding
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have strong arguments that they were intended third-party
beneficiaries under Restatement law. Ultimately, the particular
terms of the agreement are likely to guide enforcement.
Conclusion
Overall, whether an individual Community Benefits
Agreement will be enforceable depends on both the individual
contract language and state law to which the agreement is subject.
However, an analysis of common contractual terms and legal
principles shows that, generally, Community Benefits Agreements
should be seen as enforceable when executed. The test for
consideration is typically not a high standard, and the various
common CBA provisions are likely to meet that standard. In
addition, in most cases, obligations will run to any sublessors,
subsequent developers, or other parties who take an ownership
interest in the land from the initial developer, based on the
inclusion of that language. Finally, there may be the possibility that
third-party community members could enforce CBAs.
Though the decision about whether to implement a CBA
should depend on a particular location and project, these contracts
will likely continue to be a valuable and enforceable tool for
community organizations hoping to work with developers to make
their projects responsible and community conscious.

the Atlantic Yards CBA. Apple v. Atl. Yards Dev. Co., LLC, No. 11-CV-5550 JG JMA,
2012 WL 2309028, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) (“This argument [that Plaintiffs
were not intended beneficiaries] fails because the Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel
claim is not based on any promises made in the CBA, but rather on alleged oral
promises that PATP participants would receive jobs and union membership.”).

